clickup-security-basics
Harden ClickUp credentials, OAuth callbacks, Workspace boundaries, webhooks, logging, and incident response with least-privilege controls. Use when threat-modeling or reviewing a ClickUp integration. Trigger with "secure ClickUp", "ClickUp security review", or "ClickUp token rotation".
Allowed Tools
Provided by Plugin
clickup-pack
Production-grade Claude Code operator workflows for governed ClickUp integrations (24 skills)
Installation
This skill is included in the clickup-pack plugin:
/plugin install clickup-pack@claude-code-plugins-plusClick to copy
Instructions
ClickUp Integration Security
Overview
Protect long-lived credentials and sensitive work content across outbound API calls, inbound webhooks, queues, logs, and operator tooling.
Prerequisites
- A data-flow and trust-boundary diagram plus credential/Workspace inventory
- Named security, service, data, and ClickUp Workspace owners
- Synthetic fixtures and an incident/rotation runbook
Tool Discipline
Use Read, Glob, and Grep to inspect the repository, adapters, configuration names, tests, and evidence. Use WebFetch only for current official ClickUp documentation. Use Write or Edit after confirming the target file, Workspace boundary, and requested mode.
Current Contract
- Personal tokens do not expire; OAuth tokens currently do not expire but that behavior is subject to change.
- OAuth Authorization Code callbacks require exact redirects, state validation, and server-side client-secret handling.
- Webhook requests use per-webhook secrets and raw-body HMAC-SHA256 in
X-Signature; ClickUp has no fixed webhook source IP. - API authorization reflects the user and authorized Workspaces, so the app must enforce its own tenant policy.
Authentication
Use a personal token only for accountable individual/testing work or OAuth Authorization Code for a user-facing integration. Inject the token server-side through a governed secret reference, send it in Authorization, verify authorized Workspace IDs, and never print the token, OAuth client secret, or webhook secret.
Instructions
- Inventory credentials, callbacks, Workspaces, scopes/capabilities, webhooks, queues, stores, logs, and operator access.
- Remove client-side or repository secrets; inject environment-specific references at runtime.
- Enforce OAuth state, exact redirect handling, Workspace allow-lists, and deny-by-default write policies.
- Verify webhook signatures with constant-time comparison before JSON processing; apply replay/idempotency controls.
- Redact content and secrets from errors, traces, bundles, analytics, and CI artifacts.
- Exercise leak, revocation, cross-tenant, forged/replayed webhook, partial-write, and incident recovery scenarios.
Approval Boundaries
Do not rotate shared credentials, reauthorize Workspaces, change ACLs, or inspect private content without accountable owner approval.
Output
Return threats, controls, credential/tenant map, webhook findings, data exposures, tested incident paths, residual risk, and owners.
Error Handling
| Condition | Response |
|---|---|
| Credential found in source or logs | Revoke/regenerate, scrub accessible artifacts, and open an incident. |
| Webhook signature is absent/invalid | Reject before parsing or enqueueing. |
| Workspace guard is missing | Disable writes until tenant enforcement exists. |
| Security owner is absent | Do not approve production use. |
Examples
The example below is a redacted operator receipt; it contains no task text, member data, credential, or webhook secret.
secrets-in-source=0; oauth-state=pass; workspace-guard=pass; webhook-hmac=pass; replay-test=pass; residual=2